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ABSTRACT
The article analyses how robotisation as the latest advance in military 
technology can depersonalise the methods of killing in the 21st century 
by turning enemy soldiers and civilians into mere objects devoid of moral 
value. The departing assumption is that robotisation of warfare transforms 
military operations into automated industrial processes with the aim of 
removing empathy as a redundant ‘cost’. The development of autonomous 
weapons systems raises a number of sharp ethical controversies related 
to the projected moral insensitivity of robots regarding the treatment of 
enemies and civilian population. The futurist vision of war as a foreign 
policy instrument entirely ‘purified’ of the risk of morally wrong actions 
is in opposition with the negative effects of the use of drones. The author 
concludes that the use of lethal robots in combat would eventually remove 
enemy soldiers and civilians from the realm of ethical reasoning and 
deprive them of human dignity. Decision to kill in military operations 
ought to be based on human conscience as the only proper framework 
of making decisions by reasoning whether an action is right or wrong.
Robotic warfare: Towards removing prosocial behaviour  
as the ‘cost’ of military operations?
Many archaeological finds depicts scenes of – as much as epic poetry and prose are 
telling stories about – famous military endeavours that show an even spatio-tem-
poral distribution of use of force as a means of resolving disputes between groups, 
communities and nations.1 Aside from the mythological and poetic hyperbole wo-
ven into such scenes, warfare as one of humanity’s oldest social activities testifies to 
the ancient entwinement of tools, technology and creative thinking when it comes 
to the effective use of material and human resources made at moments of societal 
wealth available to the ruling elites. The main aim of military leaders has always 
1  The article presents findings from a study conducted as a part of the project “Serbia in 
contemporary international relations: The strategic directions of development and con-
solidation of the position of Serbia in international integration – foreign policy, econom-
ics, legal and security perspectives” funded by the Ministry of Education, Science, and Te-
chonological Development of the Republic of Serbia (grant No. OI179029).
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been to discover means of fighting and conceive tactics that would carry the day 
against the hostile force, at minimum sacrifice. Certain ‘leaps’ in technological de-
velopment – the bow and arrow, cannon, rifle, airplane, missile, etc. – enabled the 
conduct of military operations from an ever-greater distance, or at least to commence 
without ‘hand-to-hand’ combat, that is to say, when the opposing land units have 
not yet come into direct contact with one another (Creveld 2000; Howard 2009). 
For instance, the increased shot accuracy of cannons and rifles in the 18th and 19th 
centuries opened a new chapter in military history, enabling an attack against the 
enemy from greater distance, keeping one’s own men safe. Technological develop-
ment has also rendered weapons more destructive, such that in the middle of the 
20th century, the cataclysmic potential of nuclear weapons pushed to the absurd its 
utility as a foreign policy tool within limits of common sense. The only possibility 
was to possess and pile up this type of weapon to deter potential adversaries from 
an attack in a strategic game of ‘mutual assured destruction’.
From the point of view of the individual soldier, however, combat is no less vi-
olent – it remains ‘slaughter’, much as before. The difference is that the advanced 
military technologies renders the enemy less visible, that is, no longer ‘in one’s 
sights’. This means that killing has been displaced, made ‘remote’, and ever-more 
mediated. That being said, even today, it is not possible to achieve a permanent 
and strong land presence without occupation of territory and immediate conflict 
at short distance. This is especially true of the asymmetric wars of the 21st centu-
ry, where the most complex operations are conducted by foreign interventionist 
troops, mostly in urban environments against myriad of non-state armed groups 
cunningly intermixed with the local population (Münkler 2010: 190–194).
Historically, the politics of army discipline sums up a series of gestures and 
techniques directed at shaping man into an endurance and finely tuned ‘killing 
machine’, drawing on the masculinisation of men and inculcation of warrior attri-
butes into an individual’s value system, as well as a social division of war roles into 
‘typically’ male and female. Still, the huge amount of energy necessary for extreme 
masculinisation, that is, successful socialisation that is military training, would be 
unnecessary if people were born naturally aggressive (Jindy Pettman 1996: 66). 
Overwhelming war experience testifies to the moral disquiet soldiers feel when, 
for example, they have to shoot at sleeping enemy soldiers or anyone who, how-
ever potentially dangerous in general, does not pose a threat at that moment. The 
strong malaise means that the soldier perceives the killing of a sleeping foes un-
necessary and deeply wrong (Brigety II 2007: 17–19). In the constant debate about 
whether aggression as initiator of war is an innate character trait or not, we lean 
toward the position confirmed through a sufficient number of empirical studies in 
the field of evolutionary psychology and primatology, according to which man is 
not genetically predisposed to war, but does so through a process of socialisation; 
otherwise, men would happily go into battle and would not reluctantly kill other 
human beings (Waal 2013: xi; Ferguson 2013: 126). Our perception of violence/war as 
intrinsic to human nature is the result of cognitive bias caused by media portrayals 
of the ‘dark’ side of human nature driven by an ad revenue-heavy business model. 
This warped perspective of social reality overemphasises events of small probabili-
ty, ascribes to them great emotional impact, and creates an image of life in times of 
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insurmountable dangers and security risks. After the construction of this image, we 
accept only those new facts that fit easily into such a worldview (Payne 2015: 24–25).
The findings of multiple scientific studies conducted in the field of evolutionary 
psychology since the 1980s suggest that morality is innate. Not in the sense that 
there is a specific gene for morality, but that we naturally act in a morally laudable 
direction. The long process of natural selection has crafted a psychological mech-
anism for prosocial behaviour, based on the recognition that survival is only possi-
ble with mutual help and cooperation (Joyce 2006: 13). Evolution has made people 
predominantly social, friendly, benevolent, honest, etc. Through trial and error, 
over the course of thousands of years, the brain has produced various responses to 
variable environmental stimuli, gradually developing prosocial emotions of love, 
empathy and altruism. From these prosocial emotions issued the tendency of peo-
ple to reach for moral reasoning, even in the face of the most extreme situations 
on the edge of life and death. Natural selection has helped strengthen empathy 
with others, at the heart of man’s capability to act morally. Cognitive functions and 
emotions are deeply bound systems, on a biological, psychological and phenome-
nological plane, meaning that normative judgments are not always rational or the 
result of conscience, but rather are strongly influenced by emotions and intuition. 
Emotions are evaluations of the world not as it is, but as it ought to be. They help 
us recognise that there is a moral problem in a given situation. Emotions are the 
foundation of self-consciousness comprising our subjectivity, meaning that they 
are part of our acceptance of responsibility for who we are and how we act to-
wards others. Thus, pride and shame are the most important guides in the process 
of our self-expression and self-realisation. True personality achieves self-realisa-
tion through harmony with the personal character by striving to live according to 
the standards of a given value system: each successful attempt to behave in accor-
dance with these standards makes us proud, and conversely, each deviation carries 
shame (Döring 2007:  385).
Emotions and empathy, as drivers of prosocial behaviour and moral sensitivity, 
are a major obstacle to killing in war. This makes them the undesirable personali-
ty characteristics in a soldier who is to fight in interventionist troops deployed far 
from her/his homeland, particularly in the context of contested democratic legiti-
macy of the intervention itself. In the period of late capitalism and the dominance 
of the instrumental mind as measure of all things, empathy for military planners is a 
disturbance factor to the efficiency of a military operation. Cristina Masters lucidly 
notes that the application of advanced technological solutions in the military has 
resulted in the desirable military attributes of a soldier being constituted accord-
ing to criteria borrowed from a scientific-technological discourse (2010: 178–179). 
Military planners now view soldiers through the prism of their weaknesses, that 
is, as vulnerable beings, prone to stress and trauma, and therefore mistakes and 
inefficiency. They see their unreliability in contrast to the ‘perfection’ of personal 
computers and other sorts of brand new machines and devices. The human body, 
or wetware in contemporary military terminology, is the weakest element of the 
triad comprising hardware, embodied in the wide array of high technology, and 
software, embodied in information and communication technologies. Hence the 
onus on development of military technology that would supplant the biological and 
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emotional deficiencies of the body with the introduction of the superior, diversi-
fied interface, in time, entirely removing the soldier from the battlefield.
Burdened by earlier tragic experiences, the current century has also shed per-
spective regarding the threshold of social acceptance of war victims, illustrated in 
the chant No Body Bags. In the post-industrial poliarchies with global ambitions and 
capability, it has become increasingly difficult to politically justify the need for citi-
zens to lose their lives in wars in distant regions across the planet, of which they have 
barely even heard. This is all the truer when these conflicts result in stalemates, from 
which strong public reactions demand the cessation of military operations to avoid 
further casualty, which undermines the possibility of achieving the given military, 
and ultimately, foreign policy goals (Sauer & Schörnig 2012: 368–369). The politics 
of minimalising human victims of one’s own troops has been operationalised in the 
form of ‘warfare without risk’, accomplished in the three previous decades by em-
ploying private military and security companies, drawing on a combination of air 
and guerrilla operations, and maximising the efficiency of weaponry by perfecting 
its precision (Sauer & Schörnig 2012: 369). One direction of development of new 
military technology has been aimed at strengthening psychological and physical 
abilities through the human augmentation and performance enhancement (bionics, 
prosthetics, brain-computer interfaces, nootropics, gene editing, neurotechnology) 
as well as by connecting soldiers digitally via satellite communication with a com-
mand system based on real-time data-share on the battlefield (Lucas 2010: 290–291). 
These are plans to create a soldier-cyborg, that is, a hybrid of a human organism 
and technological (inorganic) implants, all based on a vision of transhumanism, the 
goal of which is surpassing man as he is now by completely integrating him into ma-
chine, advocated by innovators and scientists from Silicon Valley (Bricis, Internet).
The latest technological developments have also opened numerous opportuni-
ties for replacing the human fighting force on the battlefield with semi-autonomous 
and fully autonomous weapons systems, which cracks a door towards outsourcing 
the ʻdirty workʼ of war to intelligent machines.2 The best-known representative of 
semi-autonomous systems is the drone, that is, an unmanned aircraft that serves a 
variety of purposes, such as reconnaissance, patrolling, intelligence gathering and 
combat. Unmanned aircraft can be piloted remotely (Remotely Piloted Aircraft – 
RPA) from a land control station by a pilot and crew, connected to a command centre 
and communication infrastructure; or they can be autonomous (Unmanned Air Ve-
hicle – UAV), following a pre-programmed set of action (USAF Headquarters 2014: 
13–15). Seeing as they are not limited by the psychophysical abilities of the pilot or 
the fatal risk of being shot down, drones have a significant advantage compared to 
ordinary aircrafts. They fly longer, continuously, at higher altitudes and with no 
fatigue to a human body.3 Still, remote control of unmanned aircraft is not literally 
2  To be fair, the history of military experiments with unmanned aircrafts goes back to 
World War I, and several kinds were used in combat in the course of World War II. For a 
brief overview of development projects of semi-autonomous and autonomous weapons 
systems, see Singer 2009.
3  Due to limited scope of this analysis, I exclude the issue of vulnerability of semi-au-
tonomous and autonomous weapons systems in the form of electromagnetic interference 
and cyber-attacks to satellite and information infrastructure.
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‘without pilot’, since each drone is operated by a highly-trained ground-control 
crew that could number as many as 300 people (Joshi & Stein 2013: 56).
Ascribing characteristics of independence to a type of unmanned aircraft can 
somewhat confuse or mislead a reader. The aircraft in question is a semi-autono-
mous system, previously programed for execution of specific operational and tacti-
cal tasks within given parameters, in which the human presence is reduced mostly 
to oversight. Fully autonomous weapons systems would be only those capable to 
follow the three basic principles of robotics: perception, intelligence and execution. 
The task of the robot is to oversee and select relevant data from the environment, 
and then based on those data and using artificial intelligence, decide on its own 
how to react and how to execute its chosen course of action using the tools at its 
disposal (Serbin 2014: 57–60). A semi-autonomous system connects two separate 
functions – perception and execution – in between which still stands man equipped 
with a computer. By contrast, a fully autonomous weapons system would be capable 
of responding to information from the environment acquired through sensors, and 
use the acquired knowledge to decide on the optimal course of action adapted to 
current circumstances (the man-out-of-the loop model). An illustration of the use 
of a robot in combat would be one drone to observe the battlefield from its edge, 
revealing and indicating a relevant target, and then passing on the coordinates of 
the target’s position to another drone, which would then destroy the target. This 
would overcome the obstacles that issue from a human’s limit in information pro-
cessing speed (Arkin 2010: 333–334).
Given the plans Washington has for the development of air, land and sea drones 
in the coming period, we should not underestimate the influence of the global cor-
porate unmanned vehicle lobby. The Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems 
International (AUVSI) numbers over 7,500 representatives of public institutions, 
companies and academic community across more than 60 countries.4 Part of the 
defence market directed at the US military budget line items dedicated for improve-
ment of sensory systems on drones is slowly recovering after the 2008 recession. 
In the coming years, the US government intends to spend several billion dollars on 
that sector alone (Rockwell 2017: 26). The decision of the US military to begin de-
veloping a new generation of unmanned land vehicles – having shown significant 
use value for seeking out and removing landmines, clearing land communication 
and identifying objects in Iraq and Afghanistan – yet another lucrative market has 
opened up for private sector (Tuttle 2017: 38–42).
The most important document of the US military is the recently adopted Strate-
gy for Robotic and Autonomous Systems. In the long-term (2031–2040), this strat-
egy foresees the construction and engagement of autonomous land and aircraft 
systems that would allow for the concentration of commanders exclusively on the 
overall process of execution of combat operations, instead of control of robots in 
executing individual tasks (U.S. Army 2017: 9–11). The Strategy places importance 
4  According to information available on its official web page, the basic goal of AUVSI is 
to represent the interests of producers of unmanned systems and robots to national gov-
ernments, regulatory bodies, media and the public, as well as to see that the interests of its 
members are taken into consideration in the legislative procedure, above all in the US, but 
also globally (www.auvsi.org/who-auvsi).
DEPERSONALISATION OF KILLINg54 │ Srđan T. Korać
on the development of mini-robots for scouting and intelligence gathering as van-
guard for lethal robots, particularly in urban areas, as well as on the development 
of transporter-robots for delivery of supplies, allowing for a quick shift to combat 
action during the entering the field of engagement, an improvement of tactical 
possibilities of manoeuvring during combat actions, decentralisation of operation 
command, as well as taking far greater risks. 
In addition to the strong corporate interest that stands behind the very prof-
itable industrial niche on the rise, opening the futurist vision of war as a means 
of foreign policy, ‘purified’ from risk of unethical behaviour, would allegedly mi-
nimise the need for establishing legal and moral responsibility. Given that robots 
have been transformed from mere weapons into perfect warriors programmed to 
avoid typical human errors in combat engagement, the impact and efficiency of in-
terventionist troops deployed across the planet would be far greater than now – or 
at least this is what we are led to believe by representatives of the robotic industry 
and some military planners. The goal of our analysis is to show how robotisation, 
as the next wave of a technological revolution in warfare, could, in the 21st century, 
lead to entirely depersonalised acts of killing, as well as strengthen the structural 
violence of the US and other great powers towards poor countries on the global 
‘periphery’. The starting premise is that depersonalisation of the enemy – a con-
sequence of robotisation – will make easier internal legitimisation and execution 
of military interventions, thus making the use of force an instrument of choice for 
accomplishing imperial foreign policy objectives. 
Industrialised warfare: The triumph of the practice of conducting 
‘everywhere wars’
Thinking about robotisation of warfare is intertwined with efforts to remove con-
science as much as possible (if not entirely) from the practice of killing. In the late 
capitalism, warfare becomes a sort of industrial process devoid of meaningful value 
and social symbolism (having in the past accompanied war as a collective endeav-
our vital for the destiny of a political community). A good basis for understanding 
industrialised killing as a new social practice is the study on the nature of evil, by 
the Norwegian philosopher Lars. F. H. Svendsen, in which he analyses factors that 
could induce even psychologically healthy and benevolent individuals to agree to 
evil. Apart from representing the other in such a way that the committing of evil has 
for us a good rather than a bad meaning, a second factor relevant for our analysis 
is the distancing between our evil actions and others who are the objects of those 
actions (Svendsen 2010: 184–185). Distancing is most often achieved by depicting 
the enemy not only in a negative light, but also abstractly, in order to then create 
in the mind of the soldier a clear distinction between the act of killing justified by 
reasons of defence and the criminal act of killing that seeks merely to destroy a 
human being (Zimbardo 2004: 34–38). The ongoing specialisation of battle within 
the industrialised process of killing appears as a new form of distancing from the 
enemy in technologically advanced warfare. It creates the illusion that we are not 
directly participating in a morally wrong action, since military operation is bro-
ken down into numerous tasks and mediated by computers and sensors dedicated 
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to individual missions of gathering intelligence and recognition of targets. This 
seemingly value-neutral characteristic of discrete work assignments of technical 
nature obscures the moral dimension of the industrialised process of killing. New 
military technologies have created a paradox that Grégoire Chamayou ironically 
names ʻnecroethicsʼ – an idea of careful killing of the enemy with surgically pre-
cise weapons that allegedly minimises unintended civilian victims and the suffer-
ing of soldiers (2015: 135–149).
Chamayou’s necroethics conceptualises the problematic trend of dronification 
of US foreign policy, which has marked the first decade of the 21st century and the 
global fight against terrorism, defined as an increase of – albeit opaque – use of 
drones and drawing on the practice of so-called targeted killing in Pakistan, Af-
ghanistan, Iraq, Yemen and Somalia (McCrisken 2013: 97–122; Shaw 2013: 536–559). 
I will not wade into international legal and political issues arising from the dron-
ification of the US counter-terrorism policy, yet I do wish to emphasise the eth-
ically controversial nature of 21st century warfare based on a morally disengaged 
and unempathic logic of video games and carrying that logic into future robotic 
warfare. The current legitimisation of increased use of drones boils down to the 
argument of strengthening the efficiency and capability of military operations. 
Terrorists hiding in remote and inaccessible areas are more easily removed from 
the air than captured by engaging land troops, since the latter would inevitably – 
as historical practice has patently shown – be more expensive and result in more 
human cost to the US and their allies. Instead of imprisoning, interrogating and 
placing on trial – a process potentially susceptible to sharp criticism in the media 
– the public and civil society organisations (as seen in the case of Guantanamo), 
the politics of quiet removal one by one alleged terrorist is conducted far from the 
eyes of a Western TV audience. Thus, for military planners and political actors, the 
dronification of military interventions in poor and failed states with insignificant 
military capabilities represents a convenient ‘shortcut’ on the road to reduction of 
financial and political costs of conducting imperialist politics.
The normalisation of the targeted killing as part of the so-called strategy of 
low-intensity conflict could be the cornerstone of future robotic warfare and step 
towards a more violent foreign policy of the United States and other great powers 
aimed at ‘uncooperative’ (rogue) states. Some authors claim that robotisation will 
spur politicians to make more common use of armed conflict as a means of re-
solving international disputes and achievement of foreign policy goals, since they 
could more easily justify military interventions to their voters (Altmann & Sauer 
2017: 117–142). Indeed, the nature of the War on Terror has already opened Pan-
doraʼs Box of manipulation strategies regarding internal political legitimisation of 
military interventions in the form of punitive expeditions with unsustainable ob-
jectives and vague criteria of success. Derek Gregory thinks that the change in the 
way the United States has conducted wars since the events of September 11th, 2001 
has led to a new planetary militarisation. Due to the evenly distributed security 
risks and globalised threats, the use of armed forces has been expanded to areas 
far from current battlefields, inaugurating a practice of everywhere wars, charac-
terised by asymmetry and paramilitarism (Gregory 2011: 238–250).
I consider the merging of everywhere wars with virtualised ʻjoystickʼ warfare a 
plausible policy option for the future, since it could viably replace a foreign policy 
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projection of force to ‘insurgency zones’ even in remote, border areas of the plan-
et, in which prolonged engagement of interventionist land troops would for vari-
ous reasons be complicated and unsustainable.5 It is therefore unsurprising that the 
United States and other great powers have already redirected significant resources 
for the purpose of reorganising their national armed forces. By reducing the scope 
of standing troops they have strengthened special forces units and started devel-
oping fully autonomous weapons systems. 
Would the robots be awakened by nightmares of crimes committed: 
A warfare without conscience?
There has been lively futurological debate over the pros and cons of the application 
of artificial intelligence. Scholars and experts are sharply divided in envisioning 
possible social consequences, that is, how human’s interaction with fully autono-
mous robots might look like. As always, when there is talk of revolutionary changes 
impossible to clearly see from the present moment, predictions move in the range 
from sky-high optimism to utter pessimism, followed by references to literary and 
philosophical considerations of dystopias. Along those lines, Roy Amara, a sci-
entist and the cofounder of the Institute for the Future, headquartered in Silicon 
Valley, notes the human tendency to overestimate the effects of new technology 
in the short run, and underestimate it in the long run (Amara’s Law) (Brooks, In-
ternet). This thought seems to us a solid, if anecdotal, further guide in delving into 
the novelties brought by the robotisation of warfare and the use of force in the 21st 
century international politics.
The leading arguments supporting the relying on lethal robots in future wars 
could be summarised in the claim that robots can be programmed using the rules of 
the law of international armed conflict and systematic teachings on just war (Arkin 
2010: 332–341). This would allegedly avoid situations in which due to an unsound 
information and due to chaos of battle, commanders and soldiers make poor deci-
sions with fatal outcomes. Further, as machines devoid of emotion, robots would 
not take vengeance against civilians for killed fellow fighters. This assumption is 
not without basis. In asymmetric conflicts of the 21st century, the greatest challenge 
from the ethical perspective of command and execution of military operations is 
proper distinction between combatants and civilians on the battlefield. The fog of 
war – the lack of perfect situational awareness – that occurs when hostile fighters 
wear civilian clothing and are mixed in with the local population clearly opens the 
question of sound decision-making in situations requiring quick reactions to specif-
ic, unpredictable and ambivalent risk threats, dramatically complicating complying 
with the rules of international armed conflict. Soldiers psychologically burdened 
by complex conditions of urban warfare can have a difficult time quickly and cor-
rectly assessing whether perceived unknown individuals are part of hostile troops 
or simply civilians (and thus incapable of fighting), or perhaps civilians who have a 
5  This is confirmed by strategic defense guidelines published by the US military in 2012, 
which foresee problems with the USA’s capability to ensure military capacities necessary 
for large scale and long-term operations (US Department of Defense 2012). 
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certain role in the hostile combat action, that is, the extent of that role (e.g. are they 
only performing reconnaissance or are they directly engaged in the battle). This 
uncertainty is not an accidental characteristic of armed struggle; it often acquires 
endemic proportions. Mistakes that occur in split second decisions are common. 
And although hypothetically speaking killing in war can be just, in the chaotic re-
ality of the battlefield, unsound assessments could lapse into war crimes or result 
in failure of the operation, which would eventually undermine foreign policy goals. 
For instance, an attack on innocent civilians as vulnerable and unarmed persons 
has always been considered an act morally egregious and alien to the ideals of mil-
itary courage and honour (Lazar 2010: 211).
Not all scholars and experts agree with the claim that robotisation would con-
tribute to a more humane military operations. On the contrary, after the United 
Nations began discussion about semi-autonomous and fully autonomous weapons 
systems, at a gathering in Melbourne in August 2017, more than a hundred leading 
robot manufacturers and artificial intelligence pioneers, publically called on the 
UN to ban the systems’ development and application and thus prevent a new arms 
race with unforeseen consequences to civilian populations and humanity in gener-
al (Gibbs, Internet). The philosopher, Aleksandra Przegalinska warns of the possi-
bility, often described in plots of novels and sci-fi films, of the robots at one point 
acquiring feelings of subjectivity and agency and beginning to follow entirely inde-
pendently chosen aims, thus beginning to shape the world according to their own 
aims – much as humans have had throughout history (Bricis, Internet). Although 
this will not take place in the near future, Przegalinska notes that it is important 
for us now to properly understand how machines learn and acquire knowledge, in 
order to be able one day to have insight into what is happening within robots and 
prevent a dystopian situation of the machines’ emancipation from people – how-
ever much it may at present appear a figment of imagination.
A proper understanding of how artificial intelligence works is of vital impor-
tance not least for solving the issue of speed of making decisions should the human 
being remain part of the decision-making loop. Robots are much faster at process-
ing enormous amounts of data, meaning that man is the slowest link in the chain 
of command, and could thus come into collision with the preprogrammed dynamic 
of decision-making and giving orders to deployed units, jeopardising the combat 
task (Sloan 2015: 110). Equally important are potential dilemmas in decision-mak-
ing of the commander in cases when, for example, due to being out of order, the 
robot reveals secret information to the enemy or must be excluded from combat 
or else communication with it must be cut off. A further problem is how to pro-
gram a robot to act on the battlefield such as to apply principles of discrimination 
and proportionality as demanded by the law of international armed conflict. A ro-
bot ought not break any of Isaac Asimov’s Three Laws of Robotics, according to 
which a robot may not injure a human being, nor, through inaction, allow a human 
being to come to harm (Asimov 2004: 25–45). Still, lethal robots, should they ac-
quire some kind of form of self-awareness, could decide that they ‘no longer wish’ 
to be instrumentalised as machines in human service or, in the worst-case scenar-
io, declare us obsolete in the pursuit of their own goals. It is no surprise then that 
Heather M. Roff speaks of a strategic problem of robotisation, i.e., the possibility 
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of loss of human control over the conduct of military operations, even the entire 
war, should we equip robots with artificial intelligence to decide independently on 
strategic, operational and tactical levels (2014: 211–227). Robots would thus turn 
from a weapons system into soldiers and commanders who use a built-in computer 
algorithm to decide on the legitimacy of destruction of particular targets.
Increased relience on intelligent machines in the greater part of combat could 
inevitably mutate warfare as social practice. It could cease to be a collective en-
deavour of a political community, worthy of sacrifice and grounded in a feeling of 
solidarity emanating from a sense of belonging together. Johnson and Axinn argue 
that killing with emotions is morally superior to killing without emotions, because 
military honour demands a clear will to assume a risk of sacrifice of health and 
life (2013: 136). This is the will that lies at the foundation of duties inherent to the 
military profession, the following of which indicates the presence of an intention-
ality with an emotional component overcoming selfish goals (ibid). Thus, ethical 
decision-making as a basis of human action in relation to the hostile troops and 
civilians is unimaginable without the presence of conscience (Morkevicius 2014: 
3–19). Without a conscience, it is not possible to apply the logic of just war doc-
trine, as it encompasses not only the question of human rights, but also the prob-
lem of devotion to virtue in severe situations inherent to war. These virtues – e.g. 
empathy, honour and fairness – although not explicitly listed in the law of interna-
tional armed conflicts, are substantive for ethical decision-making in battle since 
they provide the guidelines for behaviour that supports the confirmation of the 
self-concept, which is a substantial human need, as well as constant dialogue of an 
individual with her/his social environment based on shared values. Robert Sparrow 
claims that it would be essentially morally wrong to send robots to fight against 
enemy soldiers because of the absence of interpersonal relationship between at-
tackers and attacked; the value attached to human life demands this minimal level 
of interpersonal communication (2007).
In a future warfare where combat is the province of robots, the lives of hostile 
soldiers and civilian population will be denigrated as insufficiently worthy of sac-
rifice of one’s own soldiers. This would violate Kant’s categorical imperative that 
oblige us to always use humanity, as much in our own person as in the person of ev-
ery other, as to act to other humans as ends and never merely as means (Kant 2002: 
46–47). Rationality gives humans inherent dignity, independent of how they are 
valued by other people (Kant 1991: 255–256). We treat other people as mere means 
when, using force, manipulation or deception, we coerce them into serving goals 
they would otherwise not accept as their own, turning them into useful things de-
void reason and free will. Treating another person as an end in itself means allow-
ing her/him, as a rational being, to independently decide on her/his actions and 
goals she/he wish to achieve. The only means allowed in attempting to influence 
them is the strength of our argument. The introduction of lethal robots into mili-
tary operations would be quite similar to setting high-tech ‘mouse traps’. Being a 
machine, a robot would not be considerate of the dignity of hostile fighters as hu-
man beings, which means that – however successfully a robot might simulate hu-
man decisions – none of its decisions could be regard ethical because they could 
not be ascribed to an autonomous person; that is, decisions would not be the acts 
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of free will, but rather would be driven by a built-in software algorithm (Johnson 
& Axinn 2013: 134–135). For instance, a decision to pardon an enemy soldier is as-
sociated with human emotions, meaning that we are more likely to surrender to a 
soldier than to a lethal robot.
In his seminal book On Killing, the American military historian and psychologist 
Lt. Col. (Ret.) Dave Grossman argues that the increase of distance between soldier 
and target on the battlefield lowers their empathic connection, which means that 
pulling the trigger becomes far easier than when we are face to face with the ene-
my soldier at short distance (1996: 97–133). Grossman brings to light well-hidden 
truth about the refusal of the majority men to kill in close combat situations – a 
common phenomenon throughout military history confirmed by massive empirical 
evidence. A soldier can convince himself that he is not killing human beings as long 
as he cannot see victims. Soldiers experience the greatest resistance when they see 
the enemy clearly or stare them in the eyes, when it becomes obvious that they are 
killing someone just like themselves. In fighting today’s wars, the killing is done 
by software engineers, meaning that soldiers never have to face the hostile fighters 
through the gun sights; rather, this encounter takes place across a monitor and via 
the Global Positioning System (GPS). To the soldier’s eyes, the death displays as a 
simple dot on a radar screen or a reading on a heat sensor screen (Masters 2005: 
123). Therefore, the robotisation of killing would undermine the soldier’s ability 
to demonstrate empathy towards the enemy and local civilians, that is, to identify, 
understand, and interpret correctly their emotions and needs. 
The lack of ability to empathise with others sabotages our moral actions towards 
those in need. Martin Buber considered fundamental human activity in terms of two 
contrasting types of relations: 1) the relation I–Thou, constituted mutually between 
persons as equal and evenly worth, and 2) the relation I–It, which marks man’s sta-
tus as the only self-conscious subject in a static, lifeless world, a world of objects. As 
Buber puts it, “Through the Thou a man becomes I” (1937: 28). However, the wide-
spread alienation in today’s post-industrial poliarchies has gradually degraded the 
relation of I–Thou to relation I–It. On the global level, this degradation owes to the 
cultural distance between diverse societies across the planet and to a lack of sense 
of a common human destiny. Political decision-makers and military planners in 
the United States and its allies devalue the citizens of the world periphery through 
their objectivisation, transforming them into ‘things’ thrown out of the realm of 
good and evil and reducing them to ʻtargetsʼ of a wide range of inhuman gestures 
– from indifference to target killing and ʻcollateralʼ victimisation. Treating human 
beings as objects or means for the achievement of one’s own goals evidences of the 
lack of empathic bond and true compassion that characterise the relation I–Thou.
This is exactly what does emerge when the idea of warfare without risk is put 
into practice: now by using drones in military interventions and in the near future 
by deploying lethal robots. It indicates a normative ʻCopernican Turnʼ with a view 
to the fundamental principles of military ethics. While its main purpose once was 
to protect life as efficiently as possible, the 21st century military technology is at-
tempting to entirely discard individual responsibility of the soldier (Masters 2010: 
184). The practice of warfare without risk has led to a profound downgrade in moral 
reasoning, relegating it to a dislocated reality of playing PC or PlayStation games. 
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The context of domestic comfort, the absence of societal condemnation and ensuing 
punishment, allows us to do in a war game things we would never do to people in 
a personal encounter. According to numerous testimonies of drone operators, the 
mental image of the target seen from the perspective of a moving guided missile 
does not foster the awareness that on the ground human beings are being killed. 
The operator only sees a radar reading and reacts to that signal (Power, Internet). 
Following analogies of the dronificiation of military interventions coupled with 
the devoid of empathic ability of drone operators, the use of lethal robots would 
further depersonalise war by removing all human attributes from the human repre-
sentation of the enemy – those traditional ‘trademarks’ of war and war strategies. 
The computer interface would switch a soldier into a warrior, except that now he 
would be completely displaced from the bloodbath of armed conflict. Fully au-
tonomous weapons systems would make the border between fight simulation on 
a screen and its reality on the battlefield elusive, which could lead to a pervert-
ed transformation of a soldier into a kind of serviceman to the robot. The robots 
would, then, take on the warrior identity, that is, the role of defender and protec-
tor. Distance between attacker and attacked would no longer be largely physical, 
but now almost entirely only psychological.
The never-ending search for advancement in the routinised counter-insurgency 
industrial process of ‘search and destroy’ ignores the human dimension and turns 
humans into objects stripped of moral value. For instance, a large number of ci-
vilian victims in drone attacks have been caused by ʻdouble tap strikesʼ, a military 
tactic in which the same target (location) receives two consecutive strikes in a short 
time frame. Most common victims of the latter strike are civilians who have rushed 
to help. The result is that communities in Afghanistan and Pakistan are now wary 
of gathering and have curbed their movement, which makes not only the econo-
my suffer, but has psychological effects caused by the insufferable expectation of 
sudden death. By introducing fully autonomous weapons systems, the devastating 
dronification policy against the civilian population of poor countries on the world 
periphery would last and intensify. Lethal robots would also choose potential hu-
man targets based on complex algorithms for recognition of patterns of suspicious 
behaviour of terrorists from a wanted list, which transfers control from that of space 
to following individuals and their activities that could indicate them being part of 
a terrorist network (Shaw 2013: 548). Robotisation would thus lead to the shift in 
managing security threats from the level of real behaviour of individuals to the do-
main of prediction of potential behaviour of the surveilled persons. As opposed 
to the soldier who can assess a situation on the ground visually, recognising that, 
for example, a local villager has lost his way in search of his flock, a lethal robot 
would, from the air, kill the unfortunate shepherd only based on indications that 
his movement coincides with an algorithm that notes suspicious insurgent activity.
Conclusion
The history of warfare indicates the numerous examples of applied technologies 
not being only passive and agency-neutral foreign policy instruments, but that they 
to an extent also appear as kinds of non-human ‘agents’, capable of affecting social 
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change and instigating military and political decision-makers to choose a different, 
even opposite, course of action. If the development of cutting-edge military tech-
nologies continues at current pace and the financial obstacles regarding production, 
reliability and efficiency are removed, lethal robots are likely to become a weapon 
of choice in the 21st century for the post-industrial democracies with global ambi-
tions. To advocates of greater relience on intelligent machines, fully autonomous 
weapons systems would indeed be an optimal policy tool for minimisation of human 
loss and the strategy of maintenance or even strengthening a global presence by 
ever-lasting low intensity wars conducted to discipline rebellious peripheral areas.
Robotisation emerges as a ‘logistical’ upgrade of military interventions if seen 
from the perspective of impact and efficiency, evaluated exclusively in quantitative 
indicators of cost-effectiveness so typical of the neoliberal model of running public 
affairs. A military intervention in that way only seemingly appears as a collective 
endeavour aimed at defending of common values embedded in strong moral sym-
bolism – an illusion cunningly constructed through media manipulation. In fact, it 
is a question of organising war as a ‘production process’, more broadly contextual-
ised in corporate paradigms and practices that supplant insubordinate contempo-
rary citizens who refuse to sacrifice their lives without reserve for bare imperialist 
foreign policy interests. State budget investments in robotisation of warfare thus 
presents the logical – and perhaps even the only plausible – next step in softening 
negative reactions of the public to future everywhere wars, particularly when their 
democratic legitimisation becomes ever-more uncertain. The robotisation could 
facilitate further privatisation of violence on the global level by increasing the ca-
pacity of private military companies as strategic contractors of national defence 
departments. The merging of lethal robot technology and private entrepreneur-
ship in meeting military demands, boosted by generous military budgets, might 
easily remove low intensity wars outside of the public eye. In this way, citizens of 
post-industrial polyarchies might remain entirely unaware of the destructive ef-
fects of national foreign policy in remote areas worldwide.
As Amara’s Law reminds us, humans are prone to overestimating the effects of 
new technology in the short and underestimating them in the long run, which means 
that the current hysteria fuelled by myriad predictions about the massive jobs loss 
due to the fast proliferation of robots is inflated. Still, the efforts of responsible 
political decision-makers and scientists must systematically be directed at timely 
design of effective ways of maintaining human control over social dynamics when 
robots as autonomous agents arrive one day. The question of whether we should 
delegate decisions about killing people to machines, declared in academic debates 
the vital moral dilemma of defence politics of the 21st century, is superfluous in my 
estimation. The planned upgrade of counter-insurgency interventionist troops with 
lethal robots would further depersonalise the practice of killing, cementing in the 
minds of both commanders and soldiers a distorted perception that combat takes 
place ‘beyond good an evil’ – in the realm of technological precision, purified of 
empathic ‘filth’ that arouses moral disquiet and bothers the conscience. 
A soldier with a strong conscience, prone to stop and wonder about the moral 
dimension of an order he is required to execute, is not an efficient ‘worker’ from the 
perspective of successful imperial industrialised warfare. A morally compassionate 
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soldier disturbs the easy flow of the ‘production process’ (conduct of military in-
tervention) and is replaced by robots. However, given that it is not likely that ful-
ly autonomous weapons systems will ever be capable to contextualise their action 
in the real environment in the way humans and animals do, the use of force in the 
21st century international politics will inevitably be followed by a program ‘error’ 
built into robots: the lack of moral sensitivity and ethical reasoning in encounters 
with enemy and civilian population. This further opens a question regarding the 
possibility of identifying and sanctioning war crimes, something that could rub 
out the achievements in respecting the law of war reached during decades-long 
struggle for an effective international protection of human rights of those affect-
ed by armed conflicts.
Robotisation as the next phase in technological purification of warfare is like-
ly to lead to the transformation of combat into unempathic automated industrial 
process that relieves human soldiers from the psychological burden of moral con-
cerns. Industrialised warfare will degrade enemy soldiers and civilians to blips 
on a radar monitor, stripping them of human dignity along with any reason for it 
to be at the heart of ethical decision-making. For all these reasons, we think that 
machines – however much they might dispose of artificial intelligence one day – 
should not be given the capacity to decide on killing people. The decision to kill 
in the context of military operations must remain exclusively an act of human free 
will as the characteristic inherent to human conscience – the only possible basis 
for ethical reasoning about whether an action can be evaluated as right or wrong.
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Srđan T. Korać
Depersonalizacija ubijanja 
Ka upotrebi sile u 21. veku „s onu stranu dobra i zla?“
Apstrakt
U članku se analizira kako robotizacija kao poslednji napredak u vojnoj tehnologiji može da 
depersonalizuje metode ubijanja u 21. veku pretvaranjem neprijateljskih vojnika i civila u puke 
objekte lišene moralne vrednosti. Polazna pretpostavka je da robotizacija ratovanja pretvara 
vojne operacije u automatizovane industrijske procese sa ciljem uklanjanja empatije kao su-
višne „cene“. Razvoj autonomnih oružanih sistema potiče brojne oštre etičke kontroverze 
vezane za projektovanu moralnu neosetljivost robota u pogledu postupanja sa neprijateljima 
i civilnim stanovništvom. Futuristička vizija rata kao instrumenta spoljne politike potpuno 
„pročišćenog“ od rizika moralno pogrešnih akcijama u suprotnosti je sa negativnim efektima 
korišćenja dronova. Autor zaključuje da bi upotreba smrtonosnih robota u borbi najzad uklo-
nila neprijateljske vojnike i civile iz područja etičkog razmišljanja i lišila ih ljudskog dostojan-
stva. Odluka o ubistvu u vojnim operacijama trebalo bi da se temelji na ljudskoj savesti kao 
jedinom pravilnom okviru donošenja odluka promišljanjem da li je jedna akcija dobra ili loša.
Ključne reči: ratovanje, vojne intervencije, depersonalizacija, dronovi, smrtonosni roboti, 
auto nomni oružani sistemi, etika rata, međunarodni odnosi
